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Students as Targets and Perpetrators of Sexual
Harassment: Title IX and Beyond
Martha McCarthy*
What was once judicially unrecognized behavior that devastated
an individual's mental, physical, and financial well-being is now a
form of intolerable conduct punishable by a court of law.'
Legal activity surrounding allegations of sexual harassment in the
workplace and schools increased dramatically in the 1990s. In fact, the
Supreme Court rendered five decisions on this topic from March 1998 to
May 1999, an unheard of number of rulings on a single topic in a fourteen
month period.2 Sexual harassment controversies are particularly sensitive
and vexing when children are the victims.
This Article explores legal protections for this vulnerable group, with
special emphasis on litigation involving Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"). After briefly describing the evolution
of sexual harassment law in the employment arena to provide a context, the
next two sections address pre-1998 Title IX cases involving student victims
of sexual harassment. Sections IV and V focus on Title IX standards for
school district liability recently articulated by the Supreme Court in
connection with sexual harassment inflicted on students by school
employees or by classmates. The next section summarizes other remedies
available to victims of sexual harassment in schools, and section VII
provides a rationale for why the Supreme Court's Title IX standard places
* Martha McCarthy, Ph.D., is Chancellor Professor at Indiana University and
specializes in education law. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Florida in 1975.
She has served as President of the Education Law Association and the University Council
for Educational Administration and has co-authored four editions of Public School Law:
Teachers' and Students' Rights (Allyn & Bacon, 1998).
1. Anthony M. Lamanna, Peer Sexual Harassment: Holding Educational Institutions to
a Higher Standard, 37 DUQ. L. REv. 329, 329 (1999).
2. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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the bar too high for students to secure damages from school districts for
sexual harassment by their peers or school personnel. The final section
explores future directions in this area and offers guidance to educators in
preventing and dealing with the sexual harassment of students.
I. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
During the past two decades, the legal protections for victims of sexual
harassment in the workplace have steadily increased, and the significant
developments in this arena provide a backdrop for the more recent legal
activity regarding sexual harassment of students. Litigation pertaining to
sexual harassment in employment is one area of the law in which there has
been a consistent trend favorable to aggrieved victims. In the latter 1970s,
federal courts ruled that individuals could challenge sexual harassment
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), which bars
public and private employers from discriminating against employees on
various characteristics, including gender.3 Initially, courts provided relief
under Title VII for repeated and unwelcomed sexual advances or
derogatory statements, gestures or actions based on sex if employment, pay
raises, promotions or other benefits were tied to submission to such
conduct, subsequently labeled quid pro quo sexual harassment.4
In 1986, the Supreme Court rendered an important decision, Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, recognizing a second type of sexual harassment
that could be the basis for a successful Title VII suit.5 The Court held that
severe and persistent harassment (e.g., sexual advances, abusive language,
demeaning behavior based on sex) resulting in a hostile work environment
is also actionable under Title VII. Exhibiting considerable deference to
guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in
1980,6 the Court ruled that employers could be liable for hostile
environment harassment without evidence that the victims suffered
economic or other tangible losses.7 The Court further noted that the
voluntary nature of sex-related conduct does not necessarily mean it was
welcomed by the victim.8
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII specifically prohibits employers with fifteen or more
employees from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, gender or national origin
in hiring, promotion and compensation practices including fringe benefits and other terms
and conditions of employment. Title VII is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and individuals can bring suits for remedies, including compensatory and
punitive damages.
See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979): Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977). See generally Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998).
5. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2000).
7. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69-71.
8. See id. at 68. The Court noted that the victim could acquiesce and the harassment
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STUDENTS AS TARGETS
Seven years later, a unanimous Court held in Harris v. Forklift Systems
that conduct does not have to cause a diagnosed psychological injury in
order to be actionable under Title VII, as long as the environment could
reasonably be perceived as hostile based on gender." The Court identified
factors to be considered in judging whether an environment is sufficiently
hostile to abridge Title VII, including the persistence or severity of the
harassing conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and
its interference with an employee's work performance.'l Threats that are
acted upon are considered quid pro quo harassment, whereas conduct that
is generally offensive based on sex constitutes hostile environment
harassment. The Supreme Court in 1998 cast some doubt on the continued
use of these categories, noting the "limited utility" of distinguishing
"threats which are carried out" from "bothersome attentions" that are so
persistent and severe that they create a hostile work environment.'"
Nonetheless, most lower courts still recognize the two types of sexual
harassment.'
2
Proof of intentional discrimination is not required to establish that an
employer is guilty of perpetuating a hostile work environment based on
sex. Courts have applied common law agency principles in Title VII
litigation under which the employer is subject to liability for intentional or
negligent torts of supervisors acting within the scope of their employment
and, under certain circumstances, for behavior outside the scope of
employment. The latter conditions are crucial in sexual harassment cases,
as supervisors are not expected to sexually harass employees-harassment
always takes place outside the scope of employment. It was well
established prior to 1998 that employers could be liable under Title VII if
they were aware of, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been
aware of, harassing conduct and failed to take appropriate action based on
such constructive notice.'
3
still might be unwelcome. See id.
9. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
10. See id. at 22-23; see infra text accompanying note 16.
11. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998). However, the Court also
recognized that harassment must still be categorized, because a hostile work environment
claim requires a showing of "severe" and "pervasive" harassment, while a quid pro quo
claim does not. See id. at 752; see also Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 975 (7th
Cir. 1997) (reiterating that "The distinction between the two kinds of harassment is
analytical, not statutory.").
12. See, e.g., Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 772 (2000); Coker v. Ball Janitor Servs., No. 99-5099, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5031 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2000); Bevilacqua v. Cubby Bear, LTD, No. 98 C7568,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1521 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2000); Francis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of
Baltimore City, 32 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D. Md. 1999); Carmody v. SCI Colo. Funeral Servs.,
76 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999); Vonderohe v. B & S of Ft. Wayne, 36 F. Supp. 2d
1079 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
13. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. 57
(1986). Such notice based on constructive knowledge (by exercising reasonable care one
Winter 2001]
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In 1998 the Supreme Court clarified that negligence is sufficient to
establish Title VII liability for sexual harassment, but is not always
required." While the employer's failure to act based on constructive notice
remains the standard to assess employer liability in connection with
harassment among coworkers,'5 it is not a prerequisite to employer liability
for acts of supervisors who have engaged in severe or pervasive harassing
conduct. In essence, negligence is the minimum standard for determining
an employer's Title VII liability, but under certain circumstances the
employer can be vicariously liable without any showing of negligence or
fault. 6  Applying agency principles, the employer is liable for its
supervisors' acts outside the scope of employment if the employer is
negligent or reckless, if the supervisor purported to act or speak on behalf
of the employer, if there was reliance upon apparent authority or if the
supervisor was aided by the agency relationship in committing the tort.'7
The employer is not completely vulnerable for acts of supervisors
because an affirmative defense can be asserted in some situations. If the
victim suffers no tangible, significant change in employment status, the
employer might ward off liability by showing that policies and procedures
prohibiting sexual harassment are in place and that the employee has not
used the available grievance process.'8 However, if the harassment victim
suffers a tangible loss (e.g., denial of promotion or pay raise), the employer
cannot assert such a defense.
Since the 1970s, Title VII decisions have made it increasingly easier
for aggrieved employees to get damages for sexual harassment in the
workplace and have put employers on notice that their actions will be
would have known) is implied or imputed by law and regarded as sufficient to substitute for
actual notice. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (6th ed. 1990).
14. See Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998). In a third 1998 employment decision, the Court clarified that same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523
U.S. 75 (1998).
15. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c), (d) (2000).
16. Vicarious liability is defined as the "imposition of liability on one person for the
actionable conduct of another based solely on a relationship between the two persons."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990); see also Burlington hdustries, 524 U.S. at
750. The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that Title VII is not a "general civility
code," and there must be proof that the harassment is severe or pervasive. Faragher, 524
U.S. at 788; see also Gupta, 212 F.3d at 571 (finding that a reasonable person would not
perceive the work environment to be hostile in that the statements and conduct complained
of were not sufficiently pervasive or severe to constitute sexual harassment).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b)-(d) (1957). The mere fact that a
supervisor works for the employer is not sufficient to establish that the supervisor is aided in
the tort by the agency relationship. Although the Supreme Court has not clarified precisely
what is required, it has noted that there must be more than increased proximity to be aided
by the agency relationship. See Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 758.
18. See Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-08; see also
Ann Hassenpflug, Supervisor to Employee Sexual Harassment, 143 EDUC. L. REP. 681
(2000).
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carefully scrutinized. As addressed subsequently, some courts prior to
1998 adopted Title VII standards in reviewing Title IX controversies, and a
number of commentators continue to assert that the Title VII framework-
or at least part of it-should govern sexual harassment claims where
students are the victims.'9
II. FRANKLIN OPENS THE DOOR
The dramatic rise in sexual harassment cases involving students is not
because the incidents of harassment in schools have recently escalated at a
phenomenal pace. The increased litigation can more likely be attributed to
the 1992 decision, Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, in which the
Supreme Court held that individuals can use Title IX to seek monetary
damages from educational institutions for gender discrimination when they
are sexually harassed by school personnel." Title IX specifies that "no
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance."' This law has generated a number of Supreme Court rulings
interpreting its intent, which in turn have evoked some congressional
responses.' Also, questions have been raised regarding how Eleventh
Amendment restrictions apply in Title IX disputes, but the Supreme Court
has not yet ruled that the Eleventh Amendment precludes Title IX suits
against the state and its agents.23
19. See infra text accompanying notes 37, 142-160.
20. 503 U.S. 60, 74-76 (1992) (recognizing that sexual harassment and abuse are forms
of sex discrimination under Title IX).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2000). There were a few pre-Franklin Title IX cases
involving allegations of institutional responsibility for sexual harassment in higher
education. See, e.g., Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980); Moire v.
Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
22. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (finding Title IX program
specific, applying only to education programs directly receiving federal aid); North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (clarifying that Title IX protects employees as
well as students, since both are beneficiaries of educational programs); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing a private right to bring suit under
Title IX). Several years after the Grove City decision, Congress responded to the Court's
misinterpretation of Title IX by clarifying that this law and three other similarly worded
federal laws cover entire institutions if any of their programs receive federal aid. See Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000).
23. There are several ways that Eleventh Amendment immunity can be abrogated.
Congress can revoke states' immunity under its powers granted by Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and states can waive their immunity by consenting to be sued in
federal court. Recent controversy has focused on whether Congress can also use its Article I
spending powers to attach a waiver of immunity to states' receipt of federal aid. The
Supreme Court has ruled that Congress cannot use its spending powers to abrogate state
immunity under some federal provisions. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(ruling that Article I does not empower Congress to subject states to private suits for
damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act without the state's consent; the federal system
STUDENTS AS TARGETSWinter 2001]
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At issue in Franklin were a female student's allegations that school
authorities took no action even though they were aware that she was being
harassed by a teacher/coach. Specifically, the perpetrator allegedly
initiated sexual conversations, inappropriately touched the student and later
had coercive intercourse with her on school grounds. The student further
asserted that school personnel discouraged her from pressing charges
against the teacher/coach, who ultimately resigned on the condition that all
matters pending against him would be dropped. A unanimous Supreme
Court held that students could use Title IX to seek monetary damages for
gender discrimination in the form of sexual harassment by school
employees.24 The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to restrict
the remedies available to individuals for Title IX violations, noting that
Congress authorizes "all appropriate remedies" unless expressly specified
otherwise.2-
Title IX is enforced by the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") in the
Department of Education, which can terminate federal funds to educational
institutions found in violation of the law.26 The Supreme Court has also
interpreted Title IX to allow individuals to initiate private suits for relief.
27
Title IX claims are directed toward the institutional recipients of federal
funds, such as schools and school districts.28 As discussed in section VI of
this Article, student victims must use other avenues to seek damages from
individual school employees. 29
preserves the sovereign nature of the state); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that Article I cannot be used to circumvent Eleventh Amendment limitations on
Article III judicial powers, thus precluding suits against the state under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). But the Supreme Court has not addressed Eleventh
Amendment restrictions in connection with Title IX claims.
In Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544, 548-57 (4th Cir. 1999), the
federal appellate court discussed at length why it was an appropriate exercise of
congressional power to enact the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-7(a)(l), amending Title IX to make explicit that states are not immune under the
Eleventh Amendment from suits alleging Title IX violations. The court reasoned that states
and their political subdivisions know that as a consequence of accepting federal funds they
must comply with Title IX's anti-discrimination provisions and must consent to federal suits
to resolve disputes. See id. at 548-57.
24. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70.
25. Id. at 66. Earlier the Court observed that the text of Title IX should be granted "a
sweep as broad as its language." North Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 521 (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)).
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
27. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
28. For a discussion of why Title IX is not an appropriate vehicle for suits against school
administrators in their individual or official capacities, see Smith v. Metropolitan School
District Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1997); Kinman v. Omaha Pub.
School District [hereinafter Kinman I1], 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 884, 901 (1st Cir. 1988). But see Mennone v.
Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that individuals may be liable under Title
IX).
29. To secure damages from individual state actors (e.g., school administrators) who have
[Vol. 12:1
In 1997, the OCR finally disseminated detailed guidelines regarding
Title IX's protection of students against sex discrimination in the form of
harassment. The OCR document, "Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, and Third
Parties" ("Guidance"), reflects long-standing OCR practices of reviewing
Title IX complaints against educational institutions. 3' It specifies that
schools must have policies and procedures for responding to complaints of
employee-to-student and student-to-student sexual harassment, including
same-sex harassment. The Guidance further stipulates that the framework
used to assess claims of sexual harassment in employment under Title VII
should also be applied in Title IX sexual harassment claims, and that both
laws prohibit quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment? Drawing
on definitions used in the employment context, the Guidance specifies that
quid pro quo harassment (exchanging one thing for another) occurs when a
supervisory school employee offers or withholds academic advancement or
other educational benefits, such as grades or privileges, based on the
student's submission to unwelcome sexual advances.32  Hostile
environment sexual harassment entails verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature that is sufficiently severe or persistent to create an abusive or
hostile educational climate.3 The Guidance imposes strict liability for quid
pro quo harassment, stipulating that a school receiving federal funds will
"always be liable for even one instance of quid pro quo harassment by a
school employee in a position of authority, such as a teacher or
administrator, whether or not it knew, should have known or approved of
the harassment at issue."" The Guidance further specifies that the school
will also be liable for hostile environment harassment where an employee
abridged Title.IX rights, victims would have to bring suit in federal court under section one
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a private right to
bring suit for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, impairs
rights secured by the U.S. Constitution and laws. See id. Section 1983 can be used to seek
damages for violations of rights secured by federal laws as well as by the U.S. Constitution.
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). However, controversy has surrounded whether
Title IX has a comprehensive enforcement scheme that subsumes section 1983 claims. See
infra note 111.
30. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
31. See id. at 12,038.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 12,039; see also Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264, 1275-
78 (M. D. Ala. 1997) (noting that a school board is held strictly liable for its employees'
quid pro quo harassment of students); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1429
(E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding a school board strictly liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of
a student, and reasoning that sexual relationships between minor students and public school
teachers should be imputed to the school district and considered quid pro quo, because
teachers represent the school and there is always some element of coercion by an adult role
model in such relationships); Dawn A. Elliston, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review
of Standards for Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REv. 2049, 2063-72
(1997).
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reasonably appears to be acting on behalf of the school or is aided in
carrying out the harassment by his or her position of authority. A
constructive notice standard is used to assess remaining hostile
environment claims, including student-to-student and other third party
harassment. The Guidance cautions that the distinction between quid pro
quo and hostile environment harassment is not always clear, especially
when minors are involved, and that a specific situation may involve both
types of conduct.35
III. TITLE IX LITIGATION FROM FRANKLIN TO GEBSER
From 1992 until 1998, lower courts offered a range of interpretations of
Title IX requirements in sexual harassment cases, giving varying degrees of
deference to OCR standards.36 Seven federal appellate courts applied, at
least in part, the agency principles used to evaluate Title VII claims in
assessing whether educational institutions could be liable under Title IX for
discrimination involving sexual harassment of students.37 Most of these
courts reasoned that the Franklin Court's reference to Meritor meant that
the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed using the Title VII framework in
assessing Title IX hostile environment claims." In 1997, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that the Supreme Court in Franklin "likened the
duties of a school district to prevent sexual harassment under Title IX to the
Title VII duties of an employer," thus placing an obligation on school
districts to protect students from sexual harassment by a student or
teacher. 9 At a minimum, these courts concluded that liability would be
assessed under Title IX with evidence that school authorities should have
known about the harassment and failed to act, and that the pervasiveness of
35. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039.
36. See generally Mark Blais, The Department of Education Clarifies Its Position
Concerning Peer Sexual Harassment: But Will Federal Courts Take Notice?, 47 CATH. U.L.
REV. 1363 (1998).
37. See Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1154 (1999); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896-901 (1st Cir.
1988); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 957-59 (4th Cir. 1997);
Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 86-88 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103
F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist. [hereinafter Kinman 1], 94
F.3d 463, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d
243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995). In a case addressing alleged gender bias in athletic opportunities,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that Title VII standards are "the most
appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards." Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
38. See David S. Doty & Susan Strauss, 'Prompt and Equitable': The Importance of
Student Sexual Harassment Policies, 113 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4 (1996).
39. Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)), opinion withdrawn and substituted by
143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1998). If a school has not established a Title IX grievance procedure
(as required under the law), it cannot avoid liability by claiming that school authorities did
not receive notice of a student's sexual harassment by an employee. See Does v. Covington
County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264, 1285 (M. D. Ala. 1997).
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harassment could create an inference or constructive notice of the
impermissible behavior.40 While most of these cases dealt with employee-
to-student harassment, three of the appellate courts applied Title VII logic
in assessing Title IX hostile environment claims involving harassment
among students.4'
In contrast, three federal appellate courts rejected the Title VII
framework in Title IX cases, reasoning that Title IX was enacted pursuant
to congressional spending powers42 and that conditions placed on the
receipt of federal funds must be explicit. 3 In a trilogy of cases involving
employee-to-student sexual harassment prior to 1998, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that school districts could be held liable under Title
IX for an employee's harassment of a student only if a supervisor (i.e., a
person with authority over school district employees and the power to take
action to end the behavior) had knowledge of the harassment and failed to
act.44 The Fifth Circuit specifically rejected using the constructive notice
40. See supra note 37.
41. See Oona R.-S., 143 F.3d at 476-77 (borrowing the constructive notice standard from
Title VII cases to assess allegations that harassment by peers and a student teacher violated
a classmate's Title IX rights); Lipsett, 864 F.2d 881 (applying the Title VII framework to
peer and instructor harassment under Title IX); Brzonkala, 132 F.3d 949 (using Title VII
standards in allowing Title IX claim for institutional liability to proceed in connection with a
university student's alleged rape by peers); see also Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch.
Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (applying Title VII standards and finding that the
school principal may not have done enough to stop the harassment of a female student by
changing the victim's schedule and suspending one of the student harassers for a day); Doe
v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (Petaluma III) (holding that
student plaintiffs can prevail by showing that they were subjected to sexual harassment that
was so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile educational environment and that school
authorities knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to respond
appropriately); Dara Penn, Finding the Standard of Liability Under Title IX for Student-
Against-Student Sexual Harassment:Confrontation, Confusion, and Still no Conclusion, 70
TEMP. L. REv. 783, 816 (1997).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
43. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, aff'd, 524 U.S. 274
(1998); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist.
Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (interpreting
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which has comparable language to Title IX, as
enacted pursuant to congressional spending powers). The Supreme Court in Franklin noted
that it did not have to resolve whether Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause
or to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, because intentional violations were alleged,
and damages are allowable even under Spending Clause statutes for such intentional
discrimination. 503 U.S. at 75.
44. See Gebser, 106 F.3d 1223; Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1265 (1997) (disagreeing with the federal district court's
conclusion that the school district should be strictly liable for its teachers' criminal acts
outside the scope of employment); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648
(5th Cir. 1997). Following Canutillo and Rosa H., the OCR commented that "the Fifth
Circuit again applied Title IX law in a manner inconsistent with OCR's longstanding policy
and practice .... The court [in Canutillo] determined that notice to the teacher was not
notice to the school-notwithstanding that a school handbook instructed students and
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standard grounded in negligence or imposing vicarious liability for its
employees' purposeful harassment.4 ' The court noted, however, that a
school's deliberate indifference to the harassment constitutes an
"intentional wrong" rather than "a wrong that flows from mere neglect.',
6
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply Title VII
standards under Title IX, reasoning that, in order for the school district to
be liable under Title IX, school authorities with the power to take action
must have actual knowledge of a sexual relationship between a teacher and
student and fail to take appropriate steps. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
denied a Title IX claim involving an off-campus rape of a student by a
school security guard, reasoning that the superintendent or school board
must have actual knowledge of the sexual misconduct and fail to act for a
Title IX violation to be established.48
A few courts, prior to 1998, rejected Title IX claims in student-to-
student harassment cases using the rationale that school authorities did not
discriminate against students based on gender in connection with their peer
harassment claims.49 The Fifth Circuit in 1996 refused to hold a school
district liable for allegedly allowing persistent harassment of female
students by male students, reasoning that a power relationship does not
exist in the context of peer sexual harassment. Thus, "unwanted sexual
advances of fellow students do not carry the same coercive effect or abuse
of power as those made by a teacher, employer or coworker.""
parents to report complaints to the child's.., teacher." Department of Education,
Supplemental Information: Effect on the Guidance of Conflicting Federal Court Decisions,
Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,036 (1997).
45. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 657-59.
46. Id. at 659.
47. See Smith, 128 F.3d 1014. The court reasoned that Title IX has no language
indicating that discriminatory conduct of employees should be imputed to the educational
programs or activities and discussed agency and agency-like theories of liability at length.
See id. at 1022-28. In a subsequent case, the same court found that school authorities had
actual knowledge of the harassment of a student by a school employee, so the victim had a
valid Title IX claim. See Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d
1220 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998); see also infra text accompanying
note 88.
48. See Floyd, 133 F.3d 786 (rejecting also a section 1983 claim that the harassment
impaired constitutional rights).
49. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
harassment at issue was not based on gender and thus did not abridge Title IX, but allowing
the victim's free speech claim to proceed); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929
F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding no gender discrimination in that the harassment of
a student for identifying classmates who had damaged her parents' property during a party
would have been the same regardless of the student's gender).
50. See generally Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996).
51. Id. at 1011; see also Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1018
(W.D. Mo. 1995), affid, 140 F.3d 776 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming judgment for school district
as rule of law due to insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the school
district intentionally allowed a student to be subjected to peer harassment; the principal's
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Recognizing that Title IX imposes liability only for the acts of federal grant
recipients and not for the acts of third parties, the court ruled that for the
school district to be held liable for failing to stop peer sexual harassment,
evidence would have to show that school authorities deliberately treated
girls' complaints differently from those of boys and selected a particular
course of action at least in part because of the complainant's gender.
Children's advocacy groups were greatly relieved that this standard was not
ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court,52 since under this standard,
school authorities might have reduced their legal vulnerability by turning a
blind eye to harassment of both female and male students.
Due to the diverse rationales adopted by the lower courts, substantial
attention was focused on the Supreme Court's deliberations when it finally
granted certiorari in cases of alleged sexual harassment of students by
school employees and by peers. The stakes were high for victims, as lower
courts differed dramatically regarding the burden of proof required to
secure damages from educational institutions for sexual harassment. As
discussed, some federal courts had required negative animus on the part of
school authorities toward the victim to establish discriminatory intent;
others had required them to have actual knowledge of the harassment
without proof of discriminatory intent; still others had inferred
discrimination from negligent acts and a few had even required differential
treatment of males and females to abridge Title IX. Thus, the Supreme
Court could seek guidance from a range of positions with very different
implications for victims and schools.
IV. GEBSER SETS A HIGH THRESHOLD
In 1998, the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District clarified the Title IX standard with respect to employee-to-
student harassment, making it very difficult for students to secure damages
from school districts under Title IX.53 The Court majority held that actual
knowledge of the harassment by someone who can take corrective action is
required to abridge Title IX. In addition, there must be deliberate
indifference in that the recipient of federal funds makes a conscious
decision not to remedy the harassment.
In Gebser, a female student sued the school district for failing to stop
her long-term sexual relationship with a teacher. The student never
reported the relationship to school officials, but eventually a policeman
statement that "boys will be boys" did not substantiate intentional discrimination on the
basis of sex).
52. See Warren Richey et al., When Kids Harass Kids, Schools May Pay, 91 CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONrrOR 3 (May 25, 1999) (quoting Patricia Ireland of the National Organization for
Women and Leslie Annexstein of the National Women's Law Center); Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
53. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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caught the teacher and student having sexual relations, and the teacher was
subsequently terminated. The Supreme Court concluded that the student's
claim did not satisfy the threshold of "actual knowledge" and "deliberate
indifference" on the part of school authorities. The Court further held that
the school district's failure to promulgate and publicize a sexual
harassment policy and effective grievance procedures did not entitle the
victim to damages under Title IX, even though the U.S. Department of
Education Title IX guidelines required school districts to have such policies
and procedures in place. 4
The Court specifically rejected basing Title IX liability on a
constructive notice standard (i.e. the employer should have known of the
inappropriate behavior) or theory of vicarious liability (i.e. the school
district is liable for intentional acts of its teachers regardless of the
employer's fault) used to assess Title VII claims of sexual harassment in
employment. 5' But, the majority in Gebser did not rule that discriminatory
animus is required to abridge Title IX, so it is not necessary to establish
that the school board wanted to hurt the victim. Additionally, the Court did
not require proof of differential treatment toward males and females as a
prerequisite to finding a Title IX violation. Interestingly, the Court did not
refer to the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment
harassment in its opinion, leading the Rhode Island Federal District Court
to conclude that "the Court's broad language [in Gebser] ... applies to
both types of harassment in Title IX cases. 5 6
The Gebser majority reasoned that Title IX is essentially a contract, in
that school districts promise not to discriminate based on gender in
programs receiving federal funds 7 Emphasizing that institutions must be
fully aware of any conditions that accompany federal financial assistance,
the Court distinguished such a contract from Title VII's "outright
prohibition" on gender discrimination by employers and their agents." The
majority concluded that in contrast to Title VII, intended primarily "to
compensate victims of discrimination," Title IX's central objective is to
avoid the use of federal funds to support discriminatory practices and to
protect citizens against those practices. 9
The four dissenting justices in Gebser faulted the majority for requiring
school authorities to have actual knowledge of the sexual harassment and
exhibit deliberate indifference, asserting that such a stringent standard
reflected more concern for school districts' coffers than for student
54. See id. at 291-92; see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2000).
55. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288-89; supra text accompanying notes 13, 16.
56. Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452,465 (D.R.I. 1999).
57. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-87.
58. Id. at 286-88.
59. Id. at 287.
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victims.' They argued that sexual harassment by a teacher violates the
duty assumed by the school district not to discriminate on the basis of sex
in exchange for federal aid."' Recognizing that teachers have greater
authority over students than employers have over their supervisors,62 the
dissenters claimed that the standard for liability in connection with
harassment of students by school personnel should be at least as high as
that for supervisor-to-employee harassment. Arguing that agency
principles should govern school employee-to-student harassment, the
dissenters found it important that the Department of Education has
interpreted Title IX as making school districts liable for an employee's
sexual abuse of students that occurs due to the employee's misuse of
authority delegated by the district.63
Gebser leaves some unresolved issues that may require subsequent
litigation and perhaps legislative amendments to provide clarification. For
example, to whom must notice be given for the school district to have
"actual knowledge" of the harassment? In other words, who is qualified to
take corrective action? There is some sentiment that only the school board
is authorized to take such action against employees because the board must
initiate dismissal proceedings; thus, the board must have actual knowledge
of the harassment. However, school principals supervise teachers in their
respective buildings and, therefore, could be in a position to curtail the
offensive behavior by disciplining the offenders. It is even possible that
department chairs and perhaps classroom teachers would be viewed as
authorized to take corrective action in some situations if, for example, a
teacher's aid assigned to a specific classroom is the alleged perpetrator.
But a Pennsylvania federal district court concluded that fellow teachers,
who allegedly had actual knowledge of a band teacher's harassment of a
student, were not school officials with authority to take corrective action.
Ambiguity also surrounds how the notice must be delivered. In 1999,
the Maine federal district court held that school officials had actual
knowledge of a teacher's harassment of a student, even though the student
made no reports to school officials.65 The court reasoned that sufficient
notice had been provided to satisfy the legal standard, because the school
district had received several reports of a teacher having sexual contact with
students below the age of consent.6 A substitute teacher, the school
custodian and a school board member had alerted both the principal and
interim superintendent regarding the teacher's apparent inappropriate
60. See id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joining in the dissent were Justices Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer).
61. See id. at 297.
62. See id. at 299.
63. See id. at 299-300 (citing Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,039 (1997)).
64. See Miller v. Kentosh, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9497 (E.D. Penn. June 29, 1998).
65. See Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Me. 1999).
66. See id. at 60-61, 63-64.
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relationships with high school students.67 According to the federal court,
these reports constituted actual knowledge on the part of the school
district.6
Also troubling is determining what constitutes a deliberately indifferent
response by school authorities. Although the term "deliberate indifference"
is used often in litigation, its precise meaning remains somewhat elusive,
and the Supreme Court has not clarified the degree of deliberate
indifference necessary to substantiate a Title IX violation. 69 The Court has
recognized that deliberate indifference attaches more blame than
negligence but less than purposeful actions to inflict harm,7 0 but the
continuum between these poles is still fairly broad. In a 1997 ruling
involving an allegation that a municipality was deliberately indifferent in
scrutinizing the background of an applicant for employment, the Supreme
Court held that deliberate indifference supporting municipal liability could
be established only if a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the
obvious consequence of hiring the applicant (based on reasonable scrutiny
of the applicant's background) would abridge a third party's federally
protected right.7' The Court in Gebser suggested that there must be an
official decision not to remedy the harassment to constitute deliberate
indifference,72 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that there is
deliberate indifference only if a school district turns a "blind eye" and does
nothing. 3 The Fifth Circuit concluded that "actions and decisions by
officials that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not
amount to deliberate indifference,"'7 4 and the Maine Federal District Court
concluded that a response must be clearly unreasonable to be deliberately
indifferent.5
Yet, statements by some courts can be interpreted as placing
"deliberate indifference" closer to a negligence standard on the continuum.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that school officials' efforts to stop
harassment must be appropriately responsive, although not necessarily
67. See id. at 60-61.
68. See id. at 64; see also Massey v. Akron City Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D.
Ohio 2000) (holding that notice provided by persons other than victims can constitute actual
knowledge).
69. It might appear that the term "deliberate indifference" is an oxymoron in that
"indifference" suggests negligence rather than an intentional wrong. The "deliberate
indifference" standard is also used to assess constitutional claims involving sexual
harassment. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998).
70. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
71. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
72. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91.
73. See Kinman II, 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999). Since Kinman 11 was rendered
after Gebser, the appeals court felt "compelled" to reverse its judgment in Kinman I (finding
school district liability for the lesbian relationship between a teacher and a student) as there
was not sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of school authorities.
74. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998).
75. See Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D. Me. 1999).
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successful, to satisfy Title IX76 The Massachusetts Federal District Court
held that deliberate indifference can be established if a school district does
not take timely and reasonable measures to end the harassment, or if the
district becomes aware that measures taken were inadequate and does
nothing more to curtail the harassing behavior.77 In a case dealing with
alleged racial harassment, the Second Circuit stated that evidence
indicating a defendant "should have known" of the harassment can create
an inference that the defendant "did know" under certain circumstances.
As noted above, however, courts generally have viewed "deliberate
indifference" as more akin to intentional action than to negligence.
Despite the high threshold for school district liability established in
Gebser, it can be satisfied. For example, a Pennsylvania federal district
court recently awarded damages to a student for sexual harassment by his
teacher, finding that the school principal had actual knowledge of the
harassment and was deliberately indifferent toward the victim.79 An Ohio
federal district court also found a genuine issue of whether the Gebser
standard was satisfied in connection with a Title IX claim for damages
based on a homosexual relationship between a school counselor and a
student. The court reasoned that individuals with authority to institute
corrective measures had actual knowledge of the counselor's proclivities
long before the incidents with the plaintiff student, and recognized that
notice constituting actual knowledge can be provided by individuals other
than the victims.0 A New York federal district court rejected a school
district's request for summary judgment where a teacher allegedly made
harassing comments to female students and allowed ninth grade males to
harass female classmates."' Similarly, the Massachusetts Federal District
Court denied a school district's request for summary judgment on a Title
IX claim for damages in connection with the alleged inadequate response
of school authorities to the known harassment of a student by a school
coach.82  Also, an Indiana federal district court rejected a university's
motion for summary judgment involving a Title IX claim that university
76. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1998).
77. See Canty v. Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 66 F. Supp. 2d 114, 116-17 (D. Mass.
1999).
78. See Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 141 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999).
79. See Warren v. Reading Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (awarding the
student victim $400,000 in damages).
80. See Massey v. Akron City Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
81. See Niles v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 13 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Morse v. Regents
of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding sufficient evidence under the
Gebser standard for a student's Title IX claim against the university in connection with
sexual harassment by an instructor and fellow student); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that former members of the university's tennis team
possibly satisfied the Gebser standard in allegations of sexual harassment against former
tennis coach, so claims were allowed to proceed).
82. See Canty, 66 F. Supp. 2d 114.
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authorities had actual knowledge of a professor's harassment of a student
and were deliberately indifferent toward the victim. Evidence indicated
that the professor had a reputation for harassing conduct, and the court
concluded that a reasonable jury could find the university liable.83
Nonetheless, most Title IX sexual harassment suits continue to be
unsuccessful. For example, the First Circuit rejected a hostile environment
claim against Brown University from a student who had been sexually
harassed by a visiting chemistry instructor and claimed that Brown
authorities had sufficient knowledge of the instructor's pattern of student
harassment to entitle her to damages under Title IX." While noting
Brown's inept handling of the situation, the court affirmed the district
court's rejection of her hostile environment claim as not meeting the
stringent Gebser criteria. Also after Gebser, the Tenth Circuit rejected a
Title IX claim involving alleged abuse of a student by his teacher because
the actual knowledge and deliberate indifference standards were not met."5
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found no Title IX violation where a school
board responded appropriately after receiving a student's complaint that
she was being sexually harassed by her teacher.86
Although there is a discrepancy between the Supreme Court and OCR
regarding what standards to use in assessing Title IX claims, even after
Gebser, courts seem in agreement with OCR regarding the issue of
"welcomeness" where children are the harassment victims and adults are
the perpetrators. The OCR Guidance states that a sexual relationship
between a school employee and elementary student can never be
consensual, and that there is a strong presumption that such a relationship
with a secondary school student cannot be consensual.87 In contrast to Title
VII employment cases, courts in Title IX cases have held that there is
always an element of coercion in a sexual relationship between an adult
83. See Chontos v. Rhea, 29 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
84. See Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Rogers v. Muscogee
County Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 812 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that Gebser standard was not met
and thus finding no school district liability in connection with teacher's molestation of
student); Sherman v. Helms, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2000) (applying Gebser and
concluding that school authorities lacked actual knowledge and did not exhibit deliberate
indifference regarding sexual assault of a student by school custodian); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999) (finding that alleged harassment of a graduate student by a
professor did not satisfy the Gebser standard for institutional liability); Turner v.
McQuarter, 79 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding insufficient notice to university
authorities of the former coach's harassment of a student to substantiate a Title IX claim).
85. See X v. Fremont County Sch. Dist., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24587 (10th Cir. Oct. 2,
1998); see also Miles v. New York Univ., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13964 (2d Cir. June 23,
1999) (affirming the jury verdict in favor of the university on a student's Title IX claim
involving her alleged harassment by a professor); Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 17954 (7th Cir. July 21, 1999) (holding that university officials did not
know of a student's alleged harassment by a professor).
86. See Frye v. Board of Educ., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 759 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999).
87. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,040 (1997).
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and child. For example, the Seventh Circuit found grounds for school
district liability under Title IX where a school principal had sufficient
knowledge of a school employee's sexual relationship with a student and
failed to take appropriate action. 8 The court of appeals remanded the case
for a new trial because the lower court had not awarded the student any
compensatory or punitive damages, despite finding a Title IX violation.
The appellate court held that sexual advances by an adult employee toward
a thirteen-year-old student can never be considered welcomed, so the
district court judge's instructions to consider "welcomeness" misled the
jury. 9 The court reasoned that since children under sixteen cannot consent
to sexual intercourse under statutory rape laws, such consent is not
appropriate in civil actions."
V. DAVIS CLARIFIES TITLE IX LIABILITY FOR PEER
HARASSMENT
The American Association of University Women documented alarming
statistics in 1993: four out of five students attending public schools in the
United States reported that they had been victims of student-to-student
harassment." The sheer volume of peer harassment has made courts and
school personnel nervous as they contemplate the potential liability of
school districts. The 1997 OCR guidelines regarding peer harassment
interpret Title IX as imposing liability on school districts if school
personnel with authority (or perceived by students to have authority) were
aware or should have been aware of the hostile environment caused by peer
sexual harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate action.92
Unlike situations where employees are the alleged harassers, there can be
no quid pro quo student-to-student harassment. Instead, victims allege that
school authorities have condoned or at least not curbed a hostile
environment based on gender where peer harassment has flourished. The
legal challenges focus on the school district's reactions to the harassment,
rather than on the district's responsibility for the acts of third parties. The
Supreme Court attracted national attention when it finally agreed to review
a case dealing with school district liability in connection with peer sexual
harassment in 1999. 9'
The female plaintiff in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
alleged that school authorities were indifferent toward her complaints that
88. See Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998).
89. See id. at 1225.
90. See id. at 1227.
91. See Louis Harris & Associates, Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual
Harassment in American Schools, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN
EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION (1993).
92. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039-12,040.
93. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
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she was being sexually harassed by a male classmate.94 The harassment
lasted for five months during the fifth grade and ended after the perpetrator
was charged with and pled guilty to sexual battery. During the five months
of alleged indifference from school personnel, the victim's grades declined
and she became depressed, even considering suicide. She brought suit,
claiming that school authorities, who could have curtailed the inappropriate
behavior, took no action.
The Supreme Court in Davis ruled for the first time that school districts
can be liable for damages under Title IX in connection with student-to-
student sexual harassment. Building on its Gebser standard, the Court
announced that school districts have an affirmative duty to protect students
from sexual harassment inflicted by their peers if school personnel with
authority have actual knowledge of the behavior and exhibit deliberate
indifference toward the rights of the victim. To establish a Title IX
violation for peer harassment, the school district must exercise substantial
control over both the harasser and the environment in which the harassment
takes place, and the inaction of school personnel must cause students to be
subjected to peer harassment or at least make the victims more vulnerable
to the harassment.95 The Court emphasized that liability can be assessed
only if the harassment is so severe, persistent and objectively offensive that
it interferes with the student victim's ability to benefit from educational
opportunities. These criteria are more stringent than those applied by OCR
in identifying a hostile school environment involving peer harassment.
96
The Court reasoned from the evidence that the plaintiff in Davis might
satisfy these conditions when the lower court applies the correct legal
standards in reconsidering the case.
The Davis majority recognized that the relationship between the
harasser and victim is relevant, stating that there is greater likelihood of
showing that a teacher's misconduct affects a student's access to
educational benefits than of establishing that a peer's misbehavior has the
same impact on a child's education.9 7 Thus, the Court suggested that
student victims of harassment by school employees are more likely to
secure damages under Title IX than are victims of peer harassment. It
would have been surprising, indeed, for the Court to have taken a contrary
94. See id. at 632.
95. See id. at 645.
96. See id. at 652. The OCR specifies that the peer harassment must be severe or
persistent to abridge Title IX, suggesting that as it becomes more severe, it can be less
persistent and vice versa. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039. The Title VII standard for assessing
sexual harassment in the workplace uses similar wording (severe or persistent). See Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 5-
10. However, the Supreme Court in Davis adopted a more stringent requirement, specifying
that both conditions must be present for unlawful harassment to be established. See 526
U.S. at 652.




But the Davis ruling left several issues unresolved. For example, the
Supreme Court did not clarify which school authorities must have
knowledge to trigger liability. This is particularly troublesome in peer
harassment cases, since many employees (including teacher aids) may be
empowered to take corrective action against known student harassers.
Whereas a limited number of school officials are authorized to stop
harassment perpetrated by school personnel, a much broader set
presumably has control over student behavior. The Tenth Circuit observed
that "because officials' roles vary among school districts, deciding who
exercises substantial control for the purposes of Title IX liability is
necessarily a fact-based inquiry."98 This court also observed that teachers
who have the duty to supervise students would likely be viewed as having
"the requisite control necessary to take corrective action and to end the
discrimination. '" Some fear that school district liability for peer
harassment may increase if courts broadly interpret those who have
authority to curb the behavior as including most school employees, such as
coaches, aids and other support personnel."° The additional post-Gebser
ambiguities regarding employee-to-student harassment, such as what
constitutes deliberate indifference and what form the notice of the
harassment must take to provide "actual knowledge," also have not been
resolved in connection with peer harassment.
Davis was a five-to-four decision, similar to Gebser, but the four
justices who joined the majority in Gebser dissented in Davis.'0 ' Justice
O'Connor, who wrote both majority opinions, was the only justice in the
majority in both cases, providing the crucial swing vote. Ironically, the
Davis dissenters who supported the "actual knowledge" and "deliberate
indifference" standards to assess Title IX suits for damages in Gebser were
not convinced that similar criteria should be used to evaluate peer
harassment claims. They asserted that Title IX's prohibition on gender
discrimination was not intended to make school districts liable for third-
party peer harassment. They argued that the majority gave no guidance as
to how to distinguish simple teasing and misbehavior among children from
actionable sexual harassment and lamented that school districts would be
subject to an onslaught of frivolous peer harassment suits.' O°
However, these fears seem ungrounded. Similar to post-Gebser cases
dealing with employee-to-student harassment, most post-Davis peer
harassment suits have been unsuccessful. To illustrate, the Sixth Circuit
98. Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 1248.
100. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joining in the dissent were Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia).
102. See id. at 672-77.
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found that school authorities did not have actual knowledge of the abuse of
a mentally impaired student by a classmate until after the fact, and that they
acted quickly and effectively once they gained such knowledge.' 3 The
Seventh Circuit similarly found that single incidents of peer harassment did
not satisfy the Davis standard of being so severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive as to deprive the victim of access to educational benefits."0
Nonetheless, it is not impossible for victims of peer harassment to
satisfy this heavy burden of proof under Title IX. In a post-Davis ruling,
the Tenth Circuit allowed a peer-harassment Title IX claim for damages to
proceed.' 5  The case entailed allegations that the school district had
knowledge of and failed to remedy the sustained peer sexual harassment
and battery of a developmentally and physically disabled high school
student. The court concluded that the criteria to establish Title IX liability
were met in this case, in that a recipient of federal aid with substantial
control over both the harasser and the context where the harassment
occurred had actual knowledge of the behavior and reflected deliberate
indifference toward the victim. Reiterating that the school district is liable
only for its own conduct that clearly violates Title IX, the court found
evidence that school personnel in this situation had knowledge of repeated
assaults and attempted to cover up the abuse without informing the victim's
parents.' °6
In light of Davis, student victims of peer sexual harassment in schools
can use Title IX to challenge school districts' actions. But the behavior of
school personnel in handling the peer harassment must be egregious for
students to be awarded damages from the school district.
VI. OTHER AVENUES FOR VICTIMS TO GAIN RELIEF
Although the central thesis here is that the Supreme Court has made it
too difficult for students to secure damages from educational institutions
using Title IX, it is important to note that there are other legal grounds
students can use to sue school districts in connection with sexual
harassment. Perhaps one ramification of the Supreme Court's stringent
103. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719
(2000) (rejecting also the constitutional claims); see also Vaird v. School Dist. of Phila.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6492 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000) (finding no deliberate indifference).
104. See Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954 (7th Cir. July
21, 1999).
105. See Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
the school district's request for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim against
various individuals for alleged constitutional violations).
106. See id. at 1247; see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 949
(4th Cir. 1997); aff'd on reh'g, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (allowing the Title IX claim to
proceed against the university for its handling of a student's rape by peers). The claim in
Brzonkala was subsequently settled out of court in March 2000, with the institution agreeing
to pay the victim $75,000. See Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Supreme Court Reigns in
Congress, THE RECORDER, May 16, 2000, at 1.
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Title IX standard may be an increase in sexual harassment suits brought by
students on other federal and state grounds. For example, sexual
harassment can implicate Fourteenth Amendment rights if state actors are
involved; individuals have a liberty right to bodily security under the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause and a right to be free
from purposeful government sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. 7 Damage claims for constitutional infringements are initiated
under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 ("section 1983"), which provides a procedural mechanism to
bring suit to vindicate federal rights but does not create substantive rights.' 8
From 1992 until 1998 it appeared that public school students were
more likely to prevail in challenging sexual harassment by alleging
violations of Title IX rather than constitutional abridgements, but now the
legal standards governing both claims are somewhat similar. The change
has occurred primarily in construing Title IX, as judicial interpretations of
constitutional standards have shown little fluctuation during the past
decade. The Court in Gebser observed that it used comparable reasoning in
adopting the "deliberate indifference" standard under Title IX as used in
section 1983 claims.'" Some plaintiffs may prefer using section 1983
because they can sue individuals as well as school districts, whereas only
education entities can be sued under Title IX." °
However, there are jurisdictional questions regarding use of section
1983 to challenge the conduct of state actors in connection with sexual
harassment. Federal appellate courts differ as to whether Title IX
establishes a comprehensive enforcement mechanism that creates an
exclusive remedy precluding sectionl983 suits against government entities
for the vindication of Title IX rights and independent constitutional rights
pertaining to the same factual conditions."' If the Supreme Court should
107. A few cases have also asserted that privacy rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments have been abridged by sexual harassment. See, e.g., Nicole M. v.
Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch.,
917 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
108. Section 1983 provides a private right to bring suit for damages against any person
who, acting under color of state law, impairs rights secured by the Federal Constitution and
laws. "Persons" has been broadly defined under this law to include political subdivisions
such as school boards and municipalities. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Rarely have employees challenged sexual harassment in the
workplace on constitutional grounds because they are far more likely to prevail using Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See supra text accompanying notes 5-19.
109. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998).
110. See generally, Gail Sorenson, Employee Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Students in
Schools: Recent Developments in Federal Law, 97 EDUC. L. REP. 997 (1995).
111. In 1981, the Supreme Court stated that "when the remedial devices provided in a
particular act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional
intent to preclude the remedy of suits under section 1983." Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). Courts have not agreed
regarding the application of the Sea Clammers doctrine in Title IX disputes. Four federal
Winter 2001]
ultimately rule that Title IX provides such an exclusive remedy, this would
greatly curtail students' constitutional challenges involving sexual
harassment. And even in jurisdictions condoning section 1983 sexual
harassment suits against school districts, the student victims have seldom
been successful."1
2
The Supreme Court has not addressed a constitutional claim involving
sexual harassment of a student, but it ruled in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services that a social service agency was not
liable for its failure to remove a child from his abusive father's custody,
even though the agency was aware of the abusive situation that ultimately
resulted in the child suffering permanent brain damage." The Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not require the
state to protect its citizens' liberty interests against invasions of their bodily
integrity by private actors, absent some type of custodial relationship.
School districts have relied on DeShaney to assert that there is no custodial
relationship that would impose specific obligations under the Due Process
Clause for schools to protect students from sexual harassment that is not
caused or condoned by school authorities.' 1
4
The judiciary has reasoned that compulsory school attendance does not
render parents or guardians unable to care for their children's basic needs
appellate courts have allowed constitutional claims on the same facts as Title IX claims to
proceed under section 1983. See Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476-78 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th
Cir. 1997); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.2d 716, 722-24 (6th Cir. 1996);
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 & n.8 (10th Cir. 1996). But three federal appeals
courts have held that section 1983 claims to vindicate constitutional rights in connection
with sexual harassment in schools are subsumed by the comprehensive remedies available
through Title IX. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 755-58
(2d Cir. 1998); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996); Pfeiffer v.
Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990). Courts holding that Title IX
provides an exclusive remedy for claims against school districts, however, could still allow
section 1983 actions to proceed against individual state actors. See, e.g., Kinman II, 171
F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999).
112. See, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824
(1997) (finding no constitutional violation on the part of the school district or its
administrators, because the teacher who sexually abused a child did so in her home months
after the student had withdrawn from the teacher's school; to establish section 1983 liability,
school officials must have personally participated in, or had personal knowledge of, the
unlawful acts, or promulgated official policy under which the acts were taken, or reflected
deliberate indifference toward the acts); D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16 of Pawnee
County, Okla., 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding no school district liability where a
teacher molested students during a summer fundraising campaign for a basketball camp);
see infra cases in notes 114-116. But see Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that school authorities can be liable under certain circumstances for
supervisory failures resulting in the molestation of a student).
113. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
114. See, e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997);
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
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as would be the case for individuals involuntarily institutionalized."' Thus,
courts generally agree that there is no special relationship that obligates
school authorities to protect students from actions of private individuals.
For example, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas compulsory school
attendance laws did not create a custodial relationship and constitutional
duty for school officials to protect students from private actions, in this
case ajanitor's rape of a middle school student. The parents failed to show
that school officials placed the student in a dangerous situation or to
establish a causal relationship between school officials' failure to check the
criminal background of the school janitor and the subsequent rape.
' 6
In the absence of such a special relationship, however, several lower
courts have recognized that under certain circumstances a student's
constitutional right to bodily integrity can be violated if the student is
sexually harassed or abused by a public school employee (in contrast to a
private actor). The Third Circuit in 1989 acknowledged a student's clearly
established constitutional right not to be sexually abused by school
personnel, and held that a school district may violate this right by
maintaining a policy, practice or custom reflecting deliberate indifference
to such abuse."7 The constitutional standard is difficult to satisfy, but it can
be met. In 1999, the Massachusetts Federal District Court rejected a school
115. See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc,
44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir.
1993). But see Phyllis P. v. Superior Ct., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1193 (1986) (finding that a
special relationship existed between the school and parent, thus obligating the school to
notify the parent upon learning of sexual assaults upon her child).
116. See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Plumeau v. School Dist. 40 County of Yarnhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding
no unconstitutional action by those with policy-making authority in connection with a
student's alleged sexual abuse by a school janitor); J.0. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist.
11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that mere inaction by supervisors is not
sufficient to create section 1983 liability for constitutional abridgments without evidence of
misconduct by school authorities or the promotion of policies that encourage victimization
of children); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no
evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the school board in connection with a student's
harassment and ultimate statutory rape by a teacher/coach); Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488,
494-95 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no pattern of violating female students' constitutional
rights in connection with a custodian's molestation of a student); Hagan v. Orum, 51 F.3d
48, 52 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding no deliberate indifference on the part of the high school
principal in connection with the football coach's alleged acts of sexual misconduct toward
several students, since the principal did investigate each incident); Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep.
Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 762 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the school board may have
been negligent in handling complaints about a teacher abusing students, but the board took
action by transferring the teacher and thus did not reflect deliberate indifference to students'
constitutional rights).
117. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding
it "ludicrous to be obliged to consider whether it was 'clearly established' that it was
impermissible for school teachers and staff to sexually molest students"); see also Doe v.
Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing "that a schoolchild's right
to personal security and to bodily integrity manifestly embraces the right to be free from
sexual abuse at the hands of a public school employee").
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district's request for summary judgment in section 1983 claims against the
district and a teacher/coach who committed acts of indecent physical and
sexual assault, including forcible intercourse, against a student."8 The
following year, an Ohio federal district court ruled that a reasonable jury
could find a school board policy of deliberate indifference to sexual abuse
of students by teachers or counselors in a case where a counselor's
pervasive abuse of students was tolerated over time.' 9
As noted, victims can use section 1983 to seek damages from
individuals acting on behalf of the state, as well as from school districts, for
impairments of their federal rights. Individuals are entitled to qualified
(good faith) immunity against damages under section 1983 unless their
actions violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known," but this defense is not
available to government entities.2° Despite the immunity defense, student
harassment victims seem more likely to prevail in section 1983 claims
against individuals than in suits against school districts. The Fifth Circuit
held in 1994 that school authorities would be liable if they had knowledge
of a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by a staff member toward a
student and demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the victim's
constitutional rights to bodily security by failing to take action to prevent or
stop the abuse. 2' Applying these criteria, the court awarded immunity to
the superintendent, who had taken appropriate action upon notice of the
abusive behavior, but denied immunity to the principal, who had not acted
to stop the harassment even though he had ample notice of the school
employee's abusive behavior.
More recently, the Eighth Circuit, while rejecting Title IX and section
1983 claims against the school district, remanded the claim of section 1983
liability for Fourteenth Amendment violations in the teacher's individual
capacity for impairing a student's rights (the teacher had had a lesbian
relationship with the student for several years).'22  The Ninth Circuit
similarly denied immunity under section 1983 to school officials in
118. See Doe v. Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 56 F. Supp. 2d 114, 116 (D. Mass. 1999).
119. See Massey v. Akron City Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
120. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982); see Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980) (noting that municipality's knowledge of its
liability for injurious conduct, even committed in good faith, creates an incentive for
officials to protect citizens' constitutional rights); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch.
Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 755-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to address whether Title IX subsumes
section 1983 claims against individual state actors, as the individual defendants in this case
were entitled to qualified immunity).
121. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451-54 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
122. See Kinman II, 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Klemencic v. Ohio State
Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (allowing a student's section 1983 claim to
proceed against the individual perpetrator, but rejecting other constitutional and Title IX
claims against the university).
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supervisory positions who allegedly abridged Title IX rights by failing to
respond to complaints of harassment and discrimination against a student
by classmates and a teacher." Noting that the supervisors were aware of
specific risks of harm, the court recognized that complete inaction in the
face of a claim of harassment cannot be considered reasonable conduct that
would entitle a supervisor to qualified immunity under section 1983. And
the Tenth Circuit found merit in a section 1983 claim for a violation of due
process rights in connection with a principal's failure to adequately train
employees or implement a policy to prevent sexual abuse of students in a
state school for the deaf and blind.' u
It is more difficult, but not impossible, to establish a successful section
1983 claim for a constitutional violation in connection with peer sexual
harassment than in instances of employee-to-student harassment. Courts
have reasoned that school children are not acting as agents of the state, so
to establish that school authorities have abridged due process rights in
connection with the acts of students there must be evidence of a deliberate
policy or practice that results in or exacerbates the sexual harassment of a
student by classmates.'2' In 1992, the Third Circuit found no such policy or
practice, deliberate indifference or special relationship that obligated school
authorities to protect students from classmates and thus rejected the claim
for section 1983 liability in connection with the alleged repeated
molestation of two students by peers in the unisex bathroom and darkroom
that were part of the graphics arts classroom. 6 The court also rejected the
allegation that the state had created a danger that violated constitutional
123. See Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477-78 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1154 (1999) (recognizing that the duty to take reasonable steps to curb sexual
harassment of students has been clearly established at least since the Franklin decision was
rendered in 1992); see also Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th
Cir. 1999).
124. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir.
1999). It is difficult to establish liability in connection with alleged inadequate screening
and training of employees that results in the impairment of federal rights. See Board of
County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409-13 (1997) (recognizing that
municipal authorities can be liable under section 1983 for hiring decisions that reflect
deliberate indifference to the risk of violating federally protected rights, but noting that the
inadequate review of the applicant's record in making the hiring decision would have to be
directly linked to the subsequent violation); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989)
(recognizing that for governmental agencies to be held liable for failure to train employees,
it must be established that one could predict the deprivation of constitutional rights from the
deficiency in training).
125. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373-76
(3d Cir. 1992). The court aptly observed that these cases entail "constitutional line drawing
in a most excruciating factual context." Id. at 1365.
126. See id. at 1372-76 (noting that the parents remained responsible for their children and
that school authorities did not reflect deliberate and reckless action in maintaining a custom,
policy or practice causing harm); see also Doe v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1891 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 1998); Doe v. Sabine Parish Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d
655, 661 (W.D. La. 1998).
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rights.' 2 A state actor's failure to protect a student from injury inflicted by
another child supports a section 1983 action only if the failure rises "to the
level of callous indifference and was a cause of injury."'28
Student victims of peer harassment seem to have more success in
establishing a constitutional violation of equal protection rights than due
process rights. Regardless of whether they can establish a special
relationship that obligates school authorities to protect them from acts of
third parties, a school cannot "selectively deny its protective services to
certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause."'29 In 1996, the Seventh Circuit rejected a male student's due
process claim against the school district, but allowed his claim against
school authorities and the district for alleged intentional discrimination
based on gender and sexual orientation.'3° Classmates harassed the student
verbally and physically because of his homosexuality for several years, and
school administrators allegedly were indifferent to his requests for
protection. Evidence indicated that the school district's practice of
investigating female students' harassment allegations and punishing
perpetrators had not been followed in connection with the male victim's
complaints.'3' Recognizing that the student must show that the defendant
school administrators acted either intentionally or with deliberate
indifference to establish an equal protection violation actionable under
section 1983, the court concluded from the record that one or both of these
conditions were likely satisfied.32  Thus, the court ruled that school
127. See Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d at 1373-75; see also
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no state-
created danger to justify section 1983 liability in connection with a mentally disabled
student's assault of another student).
128. Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1303 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lopez v.
Houston Indep. Sch.. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1987)). But see Carroll K. v. Fayette
County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (S.D. W.V. 1998) (rejecting a school district's
motion to dismiss a section 1983 claim in which a middle school student alleged that school
authorities' failure to take action based on their knowledge of gender-based peer assaults
violated the Due Process Clause).
129. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 n.3 (1989).
130. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453-54, 458-60 (7th Cir. 1996).
131. See id. at 454-55; see also Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that an alleged assault by teammates and subsequent retaliation against the
victim after he informed school officials were not based on gender and thus did not abridge
Title IX, but allowing the victim's section 1983 claim that he was dismissed from the team
for refusing to apologize for betraying team members), after remand, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th
Cir. 2000) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the section 1983 claim against the
coach and school district for possible violation of the student's First Amendment rights).
132. See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 455. The court, however, rejected the student's substantive
due process claim, reasoning that public schools have no affirmative duty under the Due
Process Clause to protect students from actions of private parties. However, the court noted
that the issue remains open of whether under some circumstances schools arguably serve as
temporary custodians of children, which might trigger section 1983 liability. See id. at 459
n. 13. The school district subsequently agreed to pay more than $900,000 in damages to the
victim. See Mark Walsh, California District to pay $950,000 in Student-Sex Harassment
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officials were not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the equal
protection claims.'33
Until recently it appeared that another viable avenue for relief was the
civil remedies provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act
passed in 1994.M Known as the Civil Rights Remedies for Gender
Motivated Violence Act, it was not intended to be a substitute for state tort
law but rather a supplement to existing remedies for victims of gender-
motivated violent crimes. The provision specified that any person
committing gender-based violence, even actions that might not have
resulted in criminal charges, could be civilly liable to the victim. But,
consistent with several recent rulings favoring a limited federal
government,'35 the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison recently
held that Congress was not authorized by the Commerce Clause or Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact section 13981 of the Violence
Against Women Act.'36
Given the heavy burden of proof for plaintiffs to secure damages
against school districts and school authorities in federal suits, student
victims increasingly are seeking damages for sexual harassment in schools
through state tort cases. Some of these tort cases include claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is very difficult to
establish given that the plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a causal
connection between the severe emotional distress and the defendant's
extreme, outrageous conduct intended to cause the stress.'37  More
promising are allegations of negligence, particularly negligent supervision
Suit, EDUC. WK., Jan. 15, 1997, at 9.
133. See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 457-58; see also Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473,
476 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999) (concluding that individual school
authorities, who allegedly knew that a student teacher and peers inappropriately touched
female classmates, were not entitled to qualified immunity to shield them from liability for
violating clearly established equal protection rights); Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver,
186 F.3d 1238, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissing the section 1983 claim for a violation
of equal protection rights against the school district due to the lack of official policy of
deliberate indifference to sexual harassment, but allowing the section 1983 claim for an
equal protection violation to proceed against the principal and teachers in their individual
capacities for failure to reasonably respond to the harassment, unless they can establish an
entitlement to qualified immunity).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
135. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-34 (1997)
(striking down provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act pertaining to
background checks on potential purchasers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567
(1995) (striking down the Gun Free Schools Zone Act); see supra note 23 (discussing
Eleventh Amendment restrictions on suits against states).
136. 529 U.S. 598, 668-82 (2000).
137. See Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1996); Niles v. Nelson,
72 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). But see Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d
326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to
proceed in connection with alleged university inaction in response to sexual harassment of a
student by former tennis coach during a twenty year period).
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that results in injury. To establish negligence, it must be shown that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty that was breached, and that the breach
caused the plaintiff harm. '38  Generally, plaintiffs contend that school
authorities' standard of care was insufficient given the duty owed to protect
students from harm. In an illustrative case, a California jury awarded a
sixth-grade student $500,000 in damages because the school district was
negligent in addressing her complaints of sexual harassment by a male
classmate. 39 A Louisiana court also required a community college to pay
damages to a student who was raped by a convicted felon who had been
hired to administer a culinary arts program.'40 In hopes of a favorable
ruling on some basis, plaintiffs often will assert Title IX and constitutional
claims as well as various claims under state law, such as school district
negligence in hiring and supervising staff, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision of students.' 4' At
present, students may have the greatest likelihood of receiving damages in
state suits alleging negligent supervision.
VII. WHY THE SUPREME COURT'S TITLE IX STANDARD IS
TOO STRINGENT
Currently, student victims of sexual harassment in schools face an
uphill battle in using federal grounds to secure damages from school
districts or other educational institutions. My contention is that students
subjected to such harassment are entitled to a viable federal remedy-like
138. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 30 at 164-
65 (5th ed. 1984). Even courts reasoning that Title IX preempts constitutional claims on the
same set of facts have not ruled that state tort claims are similarly subsumed by Title IX.
See Niles, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (observing that "it would be illogical to conclude that
Congress intended that availability of an action pursuant to Title IX to immunize individuals
from their own tortious acts"). In Gebser, the Supreme Court also noted that "our decision
does not affect any right of recover that an individual may have ... as a matter of state law."
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998).
139. See Doe v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., No. C94-01307 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1996); see
also Duncan v. Hampton County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 335 S.C. 535 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding gross negligence on the part of the school district and awarding a mentally disabled
teenager $250,000 because she was raped when a teacher's aid left students unattended);
Shante D. v. City of New York, 638 N.E.2d 962 (N.Y. 1994) (supporting the jury's finding
of school district and teacher liability for failure to provide appropriate supervision that
would have prevented the sexual assault of a grade school student).
140. See Harrington v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 714 So.
2d 845 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding the victim $100,000 in damages from the felon and
the institution); see also Doe v. Edwards, No. CV95 31 99 52 S (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)
(allowing negligent hiring and supervision claims against school board to proceed in
connection with allegations that a teacher engaged in sexual relations with a student for two
years); Mueller v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(allowing negligence claim to proceed for school district's failure to conduct a background
check in connection with alleged sexual assault of a student by a school employee).
141. See, e.g., Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999); Massey v. Akron City
Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
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the one employees have through Title VIIH-and that Title IX is the logical
vehicle for this remedy. Title IX is a targeted statute that prohibits sex
discrimination in education, and providing students relief from sexual
harassment falls squarely within the intent of this law.
While the Supreme Court has held that school personnel who can curb
the behavior must have actual knowledge of the harassment and reflect
deliberate indifference toward the victim to establish a Title IX violation,
use of a constructive notice standard instead is reasonable and legally
defensible.4 4 A few commentators and courts have even built a case for
imposing strict liability on educational institutions in instances of
intentional harassment of students by school employees, asserting that
employees' intentional discrimination should be attributed to the school
district because school personnel have control over students. 43  And a
majority of the federal appellate courts addressing this issue prior to Gebser
applied the Title VII framework in Title IX cases, concluding that, at a
minimum, school authorities' constructive notice of sexual harassment
should trigger liability under Title IX.'"
In addition, after Gebser, OCR reaffirmed its commitment to the 1997
Guidance and asserted that federal funds should be terminated to schools
and school districts where teachers sexually harass students.' Despite the
standards articulated by the Supreme Court, OCR asserts that it will still
apply strict liability in determining whether school districts are in violation
of Title IX in connection with quid pro quo employee-to-student
harassment and certain types of hostile environment harassment involving
employees as the perpetrators.' 46 OCR contends that it will continue to
assess allegations of peer harassment based on whether school authorities
had constructive notice of the conduct and failed to take immediate and
appropriate remedial action.
A central rationale for those rejecting the Title VII framework and
142. See generally Michael P. Meliti, Casenote: Implied Private Right of Action Under
Title IX Will Not Lie by Reason of Teacher's Sexual Harassment of Student Where District
Official With Authority Did Not Have Actual Notice of and Was Not Deliberately Indifferent
to Such Conduct-Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 9 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 213, 234 (1998); see also infra notes 150, 151.
143. See, e.g., Amy K. Graham, Note: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District:
The Supreme Court's Determination that Children Deserve Less Protection Than Adults
From Sexual Harassment, 30 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 551, 589-94 (1999); see also infra note 154.
144. See Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1154 (1999); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896-901 (lst Cir. 1988);
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 957-59 (4th Cir. 1997); Kracunas v.
Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 86-88 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495,
514 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman I, 94 F.3d 463, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. New York
Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, Protecting Students from
Harassment and Hate Crime, Appendix C (January, 1999) (letter from Secretary of
Education Riley); see also SEXUAL HARASSMENT GuIDANcE, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
146. For a discussion of the OCR standards, see supra text accompanying note 30.
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supporting the "actual knowledge/deliberate indifference" criteria to
substantiate a Title IX entitlement to damages is that Title IX creates a
contract between recipients of federal aid and the government, similar to
the contractual arrangement embodied in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Title VI stipulates that "no person in the United States shall, on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 47 The Supreme
Court has indicated that "Title IX was patterned after Title VI,', 4 8 and when
Congress clarified that Title IX applies to entire institutions if any of their
programs receive federal aid, this amendment was applied to Title VI and
other similarly worded federal laws as well.
49
However, it has also been recognized that Title IX and Title VII have
similar goals in prohibiting gender-based discrimination and that
harassment victims face penalties in both schools and the workplace for
absences to avoid harassing conduct. When Title IX was introduced, the
House Report noted that since educational institutions were excluded from
Title VII's broad coverage, Title IX removed this exemption regarding sex
discrimination." 0 The Fifth Circuit observed that "there is no meaningful
distinction between the work environment and the school environment
which would forbid such discrimination [sexual harassment] in the former
context and tolerate it in the latter.' 5' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in
Gebser was reluctant to apply agency principles in resolving Title IX
disputes, because the word "agent" is not mentioned in Title IX, whereas
Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimination explicitly defines
"employer" as including "any agent."'52
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of
New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
148. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984). The Supreme Court observed
in 1982 that while Title VI standards may be useful in Title IX claims, they are not
conclusive, and a focus on the history of Title VI to understand congressional intentions in
enacting Title IX "is misplaced." North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 529
(1982).
149. The Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000), applies to section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 as well as to Title
VI and Title IX. See infra text accompanying note 170.
150. See H.R. Rep. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2462, 2512. See generally Graham, supra note 143, at 558-60; Sara A. Peckham, Note:
Title IX Standards in Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment: What Are We Teaching the
Teachers?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1805, 1834-36 (1999); Elizabeth J. Gant, Applying the
Title VII 'Hostile Work Environment' Analysis to Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972-An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in the
Schools, 98 DICK. L. REv. 489, 501-06 (1994).
151. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist. 975 F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 15 F.3d
443 (5th Cir. 1994).
152. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998) (citing Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)). Fazal has noted that the two statutes are written from
different perspectives, so the use of "agents" is appropriate to identify the targeted actors
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Although the debate over the origins of Title IX and whether it should
be considered more aligned with Title VI or Title VII is intellectually
interesting, the final resolution of this controversy is not necessary to
support the thesis that a constructive notice standard should govern Title IX
sexual harassment claims. The Supreme Court's "actual knowledge" and
"deliberate indifference" requirements are not consistent with the purposes
of Title IX, which are to avoid using federal funds to support practices that
discriminate on the basis of sex and to protect individuals against those
practices.' In fact, the contractual nature of Title IX might actually
strengthen the contention that school authorities' failure to act on
constructive notice of the harassment provides sufficient grounds for a Title
IX violation. A contract suggests that certain conditions are attached; the
state elects to adhere to the terms of the contract or does not accept the
funds. In connection with Title IX, school districts attest that they will
eliminate sex discrimination as a condition of receiving federal aid-an
assurance that employers do not have to make to comply with Title VII.
A constructive notice standard, under which schools would be liable if
school authorities knew or should have known of the harassment in
carrying out their jobs properly, does not place an undue burden on school
personnel." Use of this requirement does not imply that all agency
standards must be embraced in assessing Title IX disputes. Fault is still
required, but discriminatory animus is not. It seems quite reasonable to
expect school districts at a minimum to agree that they will not engage in
sex discrimination in terms of allowing sexual harassment to persist when
they knew or reasonably should have known about the behavior. This is a
very modest condition attached to the receipt of federal aid by educational
institutions-institutions that should provide models of civil and
appropriate behavior. If a school district is not willing to make this effort
to curtail sexual harassment, then the district can forgo federal aid.
From a public policy perspective, it appears illogical that employees
can far more easily secure damages for sexual harassment than can student
victims.'55 The Court in Gebser indicated that a heightened Title IX
who must not discriminate under Title VII but is unnecessary in Title IX's guarantee that
individuals in educational institutions will be shielded from discriminatory practices. See
Fermeen Fazal, Note: Is Actual Notice an Actual Remedy? A Critique of Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District, 36 Hous. L. Rv. 1033, 1066 (1999); see also Gebser,
524 U.S. at 296-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,704 (1979).
154. A few courts and OCR have even argued that strict liability is the appropriate
standard when school employees are the perpetrators. See Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F.
Supp. 1423, 1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding strict liability to be the appropriate standard
"because teacher-student harassment is inherently clandestine, making the harassment
difficult to detect, yet easy to ignore"); see also Richard Weller, Casenote, Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District: School District Remains Afloat in Title IX Litigation
Floodwater, 50 MERCER L. REv. 781, 784 (1999).
155. See Elizabeth Rice, Recent Developments: Gebser v. Lago Vista School District: A
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standard is required to protect school districts from liability for employees'
independent actions, but the Court's posture is unfair to aggrieved students.
Children are compelled to attend school, and many have no option other
than their assigned public school.16 More importantly, the harmful effects
of sexual harassment may be far greater and last longer with children than
with adults. '57 One commentator has observed that "simple morals should
dissuade courts from compromising the emotional stability of
schoolchildren on the basis of economic concerns."'58  Surely it is not
asking too much of those entrusted with the welfare of our nation's
children for them to take reasonable steps to curb sexual harassment.
Under a constructive notice standard, school districts are not
responsible for acts of private individuals, but are responsible for how they
handle the harassing conduct. There must be a valid basis to know about
the harassment and failure to respond in a reasonable fashion. For
example, in a hypothetical scenario, where a band instructor has lunch each
day with the same student in his office with the door closed, other teachers
and administrators in the building can hardly avoid knowledge of the daily
lunch rendezvous and should question the appropriateness of the behavior.
The constructive notice standard would ensure that school districts could
not simply turn their backs on harassment that they could have discovered
and remedied through normal inquiry. 9  In contrast, the "actual
knowledge" requirement might encourage school districts to assume the
stance of the proverbial ostrich with its head in the sand. The ironic
difference is that the ostrich whose head is buried is not out of danger,
whereas a school district that avoids knowledge of sexual harassment may
escape liability. "6
The Supreme Court's standard offers too much protection to school
districts because of the level of fault that must be substantiated for liability.
Assuming that the school personnel authorized to take corrective action in
connection with peer harassment are broadly interpreted to include all
Look at School Districts' Liability for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 55 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 351, 360 (1999).
156. See Julie Fay, Note, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Is It Really
the Final Word on School Liability for Teacher-to-Student Sexual Harassment?, 31 CONN.
L. REV. 1485, 1506 (1999).
157. See generally Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et al., Sexual Harassment in Schools: An
Analysis of the "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability Standard in Title IX Peer Sexual
Harassment Cases, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1997); Rice, supra note 155.
158. Blais, supra note 36, at 1406.
159. See Lamanna, supra note 1, at 348.
160. See Honorable Susan Webber Wright, Emroch Lecture: Uncertainties in the Law of
Sexual Harassment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 11, 25 (1999); see also Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 657 (5th Cir. 1997). Given how difficult the Davis standard
is to satisfy, it is curious that the Davis dissenters seemed so concerned school districts
would be subjected to an onslaught of groundless claims. 526 U.S. 629, 647 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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school employees, the standard articulated in Davis still sets the bar too
high in that school personnel who control the environment must have actual
knowledge of sexual harassment that is so severe and pervasive and
objectively offensive that it deprives the victim of educational benefits.'
All of these conditions must be met for students to get relief from school
districts for peer harassment under Title IX. A student could suffer great
harm with school authorities ignoring the situation, but as long as the
victim still attends classes and his or her grades do not fall, the harassment
might not be viewed as affecting the victim's educational benefits.
Students should be able to get damages under Title IX for harmful sexual
harassment without satisfying such a high threshold.
A standard requiring school authorities' failure to act reasonably on
constructive notice seems to achieve the appropriate middle ground
between "actual knowledge/deliberate indifference" and strict liability that
would make school districts vicariously liable for the independent acts of
school personnel regardless of the employer's fault. Under a constructive
notice standard, damages are not imposed simply because of an agency
relationship; they are imposed because of acts or lack of action on the part
of the educational institution.
To further ensure that school districts are not vulnerable to unjustified
claims using a constructive notice standard, an affirmative defense could be
made available for districts that are conscientious in adopting policies
prohibiting sexual harassment and in broadly disseminating appropriate
grievance procedures for potential victims.62 The defense would shield
from liability institutions that have adopted, disseminated and implemented
such sexual harassment policies and procedures and have acted promptly to
address any harassing behavior. Also, a school district's coffers could be
protected by enacting statutory caps on the size of damages awards, similar
to the caps Congress has imposed on Title VII compensatory and punitive
damages.'63
VIII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. DOUBLE STANDARD IN LEGAL PROTECTIONS
The law governing sexual harassment of students is complex and
continues to evolve. Because the 1998 Gebser decision was rendered
during the same term as several employment decisions favorable to
harassment victims, there was some sentiment that a double standard was
emerging under federal laws in that the Court was making it more difficult
161. For a discussion of the difference between the OCR and Supreme Court standards,
see supra note 96.
162. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 306-07 (1998) (Stevens, J.
and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
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for students to prevail in Title IX suits and easier for aggrieved employees
to secure damages under Title VII for similar harassment. 6'
The Supreme Court's Gebser ruling was definitely viewed as a setback
by those desiring to expand circumstances under which liability would be
imposed on school districts for employee-to-student harassment. Women's
advocacy groups had hoped that the Court would adopt a negligence
standard,165 and following Gebser, a coalition of seventeen civil rights
groups started a campaign to secure federal legislation that would
counteract the impact of the Court's ruling.' 6 The coalition asserted that
Gebser encourages school authorities "to insulate themselves from being
informed about sexual harassment to avoid financial liability."'' 67
According to Verna Williams of the National Women's Law Center, the
Supreme Court decision provides an incentive for school personnel "not to
know" about inappropriate relationships between students and staff
members.'68 It is unfortunate that if an employee and student are both
sexually harassed by the same school administrator, the employee victim is
more likely than the student to successfully use federal grounds to get
damages from the school district.
Interestingly, in contrast to their negative response to Gebser, women's
advocacy groups applauded the Davis ruling, even though the legal
standards applied by the Court were quite similar.'69 Their positive reaction
to Davis is likely due to the Court's conclusion that peer harassment claims
are actionable under Title IX. Many feared the Court would reject any
school district liability for peer harassment after establishing such a high
threshold for victims of employee-to-student harassment in Gebser. The
Court at least recognized that it is possible-albeit very difficult-for
victims of peer harassment in schools to use Title IX to secure damages
from school districts.
If the Supreme Court has misinterpreted Title IX in adopting too
stringent a standard for sexual harassment claims, Congress can respond by
164. See Nancy Zirken, Director of Government Relations for the American Association
of University Women, quoted in High Court Wraps Up Term, Clarifies School Liability,
SCH. L. NEws, July 24, 1998, at 2. See generally Callie R. Owen, Note, Silence Broken:
Gebser's New Standard of School Liability for Title IX Sexual Harassment, 87 Ky. L.J. 815
(1999).
165. See Caroline Hendrie, Shifting Legal Ground on Harassment Has Made it Harder for
Victims to Win, EDUC. WK., Dec. 9, 1998, at 18; Don't Alter Sexual Harassment Policy
Despite Supreme Court Ruling, Sar. POLICY LEGAL INSIDER, July 1998, at 3 [hereinafter
SCHOOL POLICY]. See also the pre-Gebser cases adopting this standard, supra note 37.
166. See the Student Protection from Sexual Abuse Act of 1999, introduced by Eleanor
Holmes Norton (D-DC), that would allow compensatory damages under Title IX for sexual
harassment and impose a monetary cap similar to the cap for Title VII damages. See also
Fay, supra note 156, at 1527-28.
167. Hendrie, supra note 165, at 18.
168. Id. (quoting Verna Williams, Vice President and Director of Educational
Opportunities for the National Women's Law Center).
169. See Richey, supra note 52.
[Vol. 12:1
amending the law to clarify its reach in terms of remedies for victims of
sexual harassment. Congress has responded in the past to the Court's
misinterpretations of Title IX,"70 as well as other federal laws, 7' by
amending the provisions in question to make congressional intentions
explicit.
Assuming that Title IX is not amended (and such an amendment does
not seem likely), the difficult threshold students must satisfy in order to
establish impairments of their Title IX or constitutional rights does not
mean that litigation will decline. Some students may initiate lawsuits,
knowing that they cannot satisfy the federal standards, in hopes they can
settle their claims out of court for large sums. To avoid the expense of a
trial and the adverse community reactions, some school districts may be
inclined to settle in this manner. Also, as noted, students increasingly are
seeking damages under state tort law, alleging that the school district's
negligence has made them vulnerable to sexual harassment.
B. BEYOND THE LAW
The notoriety associated with the legal activity pertaining to this topic
since 1992 has certainly increased awareness of sexual harassment in
schools. School district personnel are becoming more attentive to
harassment allegations, and it is quite unlikely that they will revert to pre-
1990 patterns of dealing with this issue, which in some instances meant
dismissing peer harassment and espousing the sentiment that "kids will be
kids." Schools do have considerable control over student behavior, and
courts are giving a clear message that while schools cannot always
eliminate sexual harassment, they must not ignore it. Regardless of the
threat of legal liability, most conscientious administrators feel an ethical
obligation to identify harassing conduct and to discipline the offenders.'72
Indeed, the elimination of sexual harassment in schools is crucial to
170. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (finding Title IX program
specific, applying only to individual education programs receiving federal funds and not to
entire institutions housing the programs), nullified by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000). This law specifies that entire institutions housing federally
assisted programs are subject to the provisions of Title IX as well as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. 7941 (2000), and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101
(2000).
171. For example, General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), found no
Title VII violation in employers' denial of disability benefits for pregnancy-related
conditions. However, this decision was nullified in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (clarifying that Title VII's prohibition on discrimination
on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions); see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (interpreting the
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act as precluding awards of attorneys' fees),
nullified by the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B)
(allowing reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs).
172. See SCHOOLPOLICY, supra note 165, at 1.
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create an appropriate educational environment and to protect vulnerable
children. In introducing Title IX more than a quarter of a century ago,
Senator Birch Bayh stated that "because education provides access to jobs
and financial security, discrimination here is doubly destructive."' 73 The
negative psychological, social and educational effects of sexual harassment
on school children have been well-documented.'74
There are steps that school boards and administrators can take to curb
sexual harassment in schools and to guard against successful legal claims.
For example, all school districts should establish a clear policy prohibiting
sexual harassment and should adopt explicit procedures for filing
harassment claims. OCR requires such policies,'75 even though the
Supreme Court in Gebser indicated that the absence of an anti-harassment
policy would not necessarily mean that the school district was in violation
of Title IX.' 76  School district procedures should identify the person
responsible for coordinating Title IX compliance 7  and should include at
least two avenues for reporting harassment in the event that one avenue
includes the alleged perpetrator. Student handbooks should emphasize that
sexual harassment will not be tolerated, provide examples of prohibited
speech and conduct and describe the disciplinary action that will be taken
against those who engage in verbal or physical harassment. All parents as
well as students should receive copies of the school's sexual harassment
policies.
School authorities also should educate all staff members and students
regarding what sexual harassment is, what harmful effects it has, how it can
be avoided and how to identify signs that harassment is taking place. In-
service sessions should be provided for staff members and assemblies for
students that focus on all forms of harassment as well as other types of
inappropriate behavior and expression. The federal government,
professional education associations and commercial publishers have
produced materials for use with school personnel and students in this
regard. Simple exercises such as having staff members or students appraise
how they would feel if they or their family members were the target of
various comments and behaviors can help individuals become sensitive to
what constitutes inappropriate behavior and to distinguish harassment from
innocent actions. Any accusations of harassment should, of course, be
promptly investigated with corrective measures taken in a timely fashion.
Moreover, irrespective of whether particular behaviors violate the law,
school personnel should be diligent in their efforts to create appropriate
learning environments that are free from harassment. Inaction can no
173. 118 CONG. REc. 5804-15 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
174. See generally Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 157.
175. See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
176. See Gebser v. Lago Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,291-92 (1998).
177. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.8, 106.9 (2000).
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longer be justified.
It is inevitable that the increased awareness of sexual harassment will
result in some students filing groundless complaints. While such
groundless claims cannot satisfy the stringent legal standards announced in
Gebser and Davis, they can harm individuals and consume valuable staff
time, diverting attention from learning activities.' A New York federal
judge recently lamented that a "case involving an unruly little boy and a
sensitive little girl-and nothing 'sexual' as adults understand that term-
would (and did) survive a pre-discovery motion to dismiss," utilizing
countless hours of school resources and taxpayer funds and subjecting a
young girl to hours of questioning about painful childhood teasing.'79
Following the Davis decision, the media highlighted the potential for
frivolous claims to be filed. Indeed, the cover of the New York Times
magazine section after Davis depicted two very young children in an
innocent hug with the caption "Harassment?" in large letters. 8 ' School
assemblies and staff development sessions as well as discussions during
classes should address the dangers of overreacting to the Supreme Court
rulings and to misinterpreting the legal standards. 8 ' But even if some
frivolous claims are initiated, they may be a small price to pay for
increasing awareness of the harmful effects of harassing conduct.
IX. CONCLUSION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 should be the most
appropriate federal vehicle for student victims of sexual harassment to
secure damages from school districts. However, the Supreme Court has
undermined the efficacy of this provision in combating sexual harassment
in schools by establishing an "actual knowledge/deliberate indifference"
standard to assess Title IX claims. Instead of being subjected to this
stringent standard, suits seeking damages under Title IX for sexual
harassment of students by school employees or peers should be successful
if it is established that school personnel failed to act appropriately when
they knew or reasonably should have known about the harassment.
A constructive notice standard under Title IX would strengthen the
distinction between Title IX and constitutional requirements in connection
with students' sexual harassment claims, a distinction that has become
somewhat blurred recently. Such a distinction is appropriate, because it
should be more difficult to substantiate a constitutional impairment than a
178. See Caroline Hendrie, Living Through a Teacher's Nightmare: False Accusations,
EDUC. WK., Dec. 9, 1998, at 19.
179. Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447,456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
180. Cynthia Corney, Harassment? The New Sex Monitors are Patrolling the Halls,-N.Y.
TIMES MAG., June 13, 1999, 43-47, 67, 73, 80-82.
181. See generally Note, False Claims of Sexual Harassment in Education: The Path to an
Appropriate Remedy for the Wrongly Accused, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1431, 1431-54 (1998).
STUDENTS AS TARGETSWinter 20011
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
violation of a federal law-a law that educational institutions have agreed
to uphold as a condition of receiving federal funds. A constructive notice
standard would provide student victims an appropriate remedy that strikes
the proper balance between having little federal recourse and unreasonably
subjecting schools to damages awards. Students comprise a vulnerable,
captive group that should have a meaningful federal remedy to challenge
sexual harassment, and schools should be put on notice that they cannot
ignore this significant problem. After all, "a sexually abusive environment
inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from developing... full
intellectual potential and receiving the most from the academic program."'
82
And if sexual harassment is allowed in the schools today, it will be
repeated in the workplace tomorrow.
182. Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998).
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